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COMMENT
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., Inc.:
The Supreme Court "Goes for the
Gold" and Allows Trademark Protec-
tion for Color Per Se
INTRODUCION
When a consumer sees a product with a particular coloration,
the consumer usually believes the color to be mere decoration, not
an indication of the product's source.' In other words, consumers
do not automatically think of color as a trademark.2 However,
there are situations in which color may act as a trademark, such as
the color pink for fibrous glass insulation3 or blue for sugar-substi-
tute sweetener packets.4 Although a color may be an unusual
trademark compared to more standard word marks, courts have
noted that the Lanham Act significantly broadened the range of
trademarks that can be federally registered.5 For example, some
types of trademarks that previously were unorthodox, but are now
registrable in the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO") are sounds,6 smells,7 product shapes8 and the location of
1. See Anthony V. Lupo, The Pink Panther Sings the Blues: Is Color Capable of
Trademark Protection?, 21 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 637, 663-664 (1991).
2. The Lanham Act (The Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993)), defines a trademark as "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof... used by a person... to identify and distinguish his or her goods
... from those manufactured or sold by others .. " 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
3. See In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(granting trademark registration for the color pink as applied to Owens-Coming's
Fiberglas' insulation).
4. See NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1990).
5. See, e.g., Owens-Coming, 774 F.2d at 1119 ("Under the Lanham Act trademark
registration became available to many types of previously excluded indicia"); J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 25.1, at 25-4 to -5 (3d ed. 1995)
("Today, the law of unfair competition and trademarks has progressed.., to encompass
any form of competition or selling which contravenes society's current concepts of 'fair-
ness"') (footnotes omitted).
6. Registration No. 916,522 (July 13, 1971) and Registration No. 523,616 (Apr. 4,
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a tag on goods.9 Most recently, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's
ban on color trademarks by granting trademark protection for color
alone, or color per se, in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 0 a
case in which Jacobson Products Co. ("Jacobson") was found to
have infringed the color trademark of Qualitex Co. ("Qualitex").
This decision resolved the split among the circuits regarding trade-
mark protection for color alone. 1
A color per se trademark is a color used in a uniform, non-
distinctive manner, and not in conjunction with any symbol.' 2 The
idea that colors in combination with symbols, such as a red trian-
gle, can be trademarks has been long recognized, 13 but color alone
trademarks are relatively new.
This Comment argues that the United States Supreme Court in
Qualitex was essentially correct in following the guidance provided
by the Federal and Eighth Circuits, which have approved or adopt-
ed color per se as a trademark, rather than the Ninth and Seventh
Circuits, which have denied trademark protection. Part I discusses
the pre-Qualitex jurisprudence relating to color alone marks. Part
II discusses the facts and procedural history of Qualitex, followed
1950) (the musical notes G, E, C for the National Broadcasting Corp.); see George
Gottlieb, In case You Missed It..., 62 TRADEMARK REP. 605, 605 & n.2 (1972).
7. In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (dealing with fragrance
applied to sewing thread and embroidery yam).
8. In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (dealing with
shape of a household cleaner bottle).
9. In re Levi Strauss & Co., 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 348 (T.T.A.B. 1970).
10. 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995), rev'g 13 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1994).
11. Compare, e.g., NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1990) and
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1994) (denying trademark
protection for color alone) with In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116
(Fed. Cir. 1985) and Master Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1993)
(upholding trademark protection for color alone).
12. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7.16, at 7-66.
13. See NutraSweet Company v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 1990)
(a color "may be protected if it is used in connection with some symbol or design or
impressed in a particular design, as a circle, square, triangle, a cross, or a star" (citing
Barbasol Co. v. Jacobs, 160 F.2d 336, 338 (7th Cir, 1947))); see also Craig Summerfield,
Color as a Trademark and the Mere Color Rule: The Circuit Split for Color Alone 68
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 973, 979 (1993) ("Color in design is granted registration").
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by an analysis of the arguments presented by both parties to the
Supreme Court. Part IH discusses the Supreme Court's decision
and how the reasons for allowing color trademarkswere persuasive
to the Court. Part IV analyzes the Supreme Court's decision and
concludes that the Court has left color marks with less than ideal
trademark protection.
I. PRE-QUALITEX JURISPRUDENCE
Prior to 1985, no United States court had granted trademark
protection to color alone. 4 This may be because of the Supreme
Court's comment in 1906 that "[w]hether mere color can constitute
a valid trade-mark may admit of doubt. Doubtless it may, if it is
impressed in a particular design, as a circle, square, triangle, a
cross, or a star. But the authorities do not go farther than this.'
Even after the liberalizing effect of the Lanham Act in 1946,16
however, courts were still reluctant to grant trademark protection
or registration for color alone.'7
In 1985, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit ("CAFC"), in In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corpora-
tion,'8 was the first circuit court to hold that the color of goods
may serve as a trademark if the statutory requirements are met.19
The Owens-Corning court considered whether the color of Owens-
14. See Lawrence B. Ebert, Trademark Protection in Color: Do it by the Numbers!,
84 TRADEMARK REP. 379 (1994).
15. A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166,
171 (1906); see also Ebert, supra note 14, at 380-81.
16. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
17. See Ebert, supra note 14, at 384; see also Michael B. Landau, Trademark Protec-
tion for Color Per Se After Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.: Another Grey Area
in the Law, 2 U.C.L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 6, n.20 (1995) (collecting cases denying trade-
mark protection for color alone).
18. 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
19. Id. at 1122. For example, a trademark is not registrable if it is merely descriptive
of the product. 15 U.S.C. §1052(e) (1988). Registrable trademarks include "arbitrary"
or "fanciful" marks that do not describe the goods and "descriptive" marks, which are
registrable if they become associated with the goods in the minds of consumers. See
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1976); see
also infra, notes 23-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of secondary meaning and
descriptive marks.
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Coming's highly popular pink fibrous glass insulation acted as a
trademark.2' Owens-Coming used the color in television and print
advertisements depicting the Pink Panther cartoon character along-
side Owens-Coming's insulation with slogans such as, "Put your
House in the Pink.
21
The CAFC determined that the pink color alone, without any
other words or symbols, signified to the consumer that the insula-
tion came from a particular manufacturer.22 In such a case, the
court determined that the color is considered to have "secondary
meaning. 23 The color identified the source of the goods, as re-
quired by the Lanham Act.24
Since Owens-Corning, the Eighth Circuit and other courts fol-
lowed the CAFC's lead and allowed trademark protection for color
per se, while others, such as the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, main-
tained the traditional view that color per se is not protectable.25
This split resulted in the inconsistent enforcement of national trade-
mark rights,26 prompting the United States Supreme Court to grant
certiorari in Qualitex to decide whether the Lanham Act prohibits
the registration of color alone trademarks.27 As a result of the
Supreme Court's unanimous decision on March 28, 1995 that a
20. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1118.
21. See id. at 1125-26 (discussing Owens-Coming's advertising expenditures of more
than $42 million over a 10-year period, including ads during many major television
events).
22. Id. at 1127.
23. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 120 L.Ed.2d 615, 622 n.4 (1992) ('To
establish secondary meaning, a manufacturer must show that, in the minds of the public,
the primary significance of a product feature or term is to identify the source of the
product rather than the product itself") (quoting Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456
U.S. 844, 851, n. 11 (1982)); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 5, at § 11.09; Ebert, supra
note 14, at 385 n.44 ("In the context of trademark law, secondary meaning refers to
meaning, acquired in the market place, which has taken on primary importance. It is
equivalent to an association between the trademark and the source of goods such that a
consumer would more likely associate the goods with their source than with the earlier-in-
time primary [descriptive] meaning.").
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988) (a trademark, by definition, must "indicate the source
of the goods, even if that source is unknown").
25. See Landau, supra note 17, at 2; Ebert, supra note 14, at 393.
26. See Summerfield, supra note 13, at 977-978.
27. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S.Ct. 1300, 1302 (1995).
[Vol. 5:481
1995] QUALITEX V. JACOBSON: COLOR PER SE TRADEMARKS 485
blanket prohibition on color alone trademarks is inappropriate,
color per se is now clearly eligible for federal registration and con-
sidered valid in all circuits.2
II. THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF QUALrrEx
A. The District Court Considers Green-Gold
In 1990, Qualitex Company sued Jacobson Products Co., Inc.,
in federal court for trade dress infringement and unfair competi-
29tion. In the 1950s, Qualitex began manufacturing and selling
press pads for use on dry cleaning presses.3 ° To distinguish their
Sun Glow ® press pads from those of other manufacturers, Qualitex
instructed the finisher of the cover fabric to dye the fabric a specif-
ic shade of green-gold," which was technically described as "brass
#6587. ' 32 Since Qualitex began manufacturing the pads, the press
pads have always had the same green-gold color.33
To help promote the Sun Glow® pads and identify them with
Qualitex, the company used the specific shade of green-gold in its
marketing efforts. 34 The green-gold color had been used in color
advertisements for the pads in the leading trade publications since
1970."5 Qualitex prepared its bulletins, trade show flyers, bro-
chures and mailers with the green-gold color.36 Further, when
displaying its wares in trade shows, Qualitex draped its booth with
the green-gold cover material to further identify the particular color
with Qualitex press pads.37 Overall, from 1960 to 1990, Qualitex
expended over $1.6 million for advertising the green-gold color and
promoting it at trade shows.3
28. Id. at 1308.
29. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1457 (C.D. Cal.
1991).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1458.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.; see also Ebert, supra note 14, at 386 (citing advertising expenditures as one
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Jacobson has been in the dry cleaning and garment industry
business since the early 1950s. In 1989, Jacobson decided to man-
ufacture its own press pads.39 With a swatch of the Qualitex mate-
rial as a sample, Jacobson tried to obtain the same material with
the same color.4° Jacobson claimed to want the material for pads
to be sold in foreign markets, so a third party supplied Jacobson
with seven hundred yards of Qualitex green-gold "seconds" from
the same fabric finisher used by Qualitex. 41 Once that initial ship-
ment ran out, the Qualitex fabric finisher refused to supply any
more, noting that the green-gold color belonged to Qualitex.42
Jacobson then approached another mill to have the Qualitex swatch
analyzed and duplicated, resulting in a shipment of over five thou-
sand yards of green-gold material, which appeared on the market
in approximately July 1989 as Jacobson "Magic Glow" pads.43
While the color was closely matched to Qualitex' pads, the United
States District Court for the Central District of California found
that the Jacobson "Magic Glow" pads were of inferior quality in
many other respects when compared to the Sun Glow® pads.44
After filing its complaint against Jacobson with the district
court, Qualitex filed with the PTO to obtain registration for the
green-gold color for press pads.45 The trademark was subsequently
registered, granting to Qualitex the statutory benefits of a trademark
registration. 46  These benefits include a registration certificate,
which is prima facie evidence of: (1) the validity of the trademark;
(2) Qualitex' ownership of the trademark; and (3) Qualitex' exclu-
of the factors considered by courts in assessing whether a mark has acquired secondary
meaning).
39. Id. at 1458.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1459. "Seconds" can be production overruns not sent to the original
purchaser.
42. Id.
43. Id. While "Magic Glow" sounds superficially like a knock-off of "Sun Glow,"
there was at least some evidence presented to the Supreme Court that Jacobson's "Magic"
line of products was well known in the industry. See Qualitex, No. 93-1577, Brief for
Respondent, 1994 WL 687525 at *3. The District Court did not mention this evidence.
44. Qualitex, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
45. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1302 (1995).
46. Registration No. 1,633,711, issued Feb. 5, 1991.
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sive right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in connec-
tion with the goods specified in the certificate.47
In general, the district court found that as a result of Qualitex'
long and exclusive use of the green-gold color in the marketplace,
the color had acquired distinctiveness or "secondary meaning.
48
The concept of secondary meaning is based on the idea that marks
that are descriptive of a product, such as the color yellow for the
flavor lemon, are ordinarily not protectable as trademarks.49 Some
marks may be protected, however, if they have acquired an associa-
tion, or secondary meaning, for the consuming public as an identi-
fier of the source of the goods.50 To establish secondary meaning
for a mark, a party "must show that the primary significance of the
[mark] in the minds of the consuming public is not the product but
the producer., 51 In Qualitex, the district court found that the green-
gold color was sufficiently identified with Qualitex as the manufac-
turer of the press pad that the color had acquired secondary mean-
ing.52 There was evidence that some purchasers had become so
familiar with the green-gold color that they ordered the press pads
over the telephone by merely describing its color.5 3 There was also
evidence that a large segment of the buyers at various dry cleaning
establishments did not speak English and that they relied more on
the color of the product to identify its source. 4
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1988).
48. Qualitex, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461. See also supra notes 23-24 and accom-
panying text discussing secondary meaning.
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (1988) (trademark shall be refused registration if it
is "merely descriptive" of the goods).
50. Zatarain's, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir.
1983); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0 (1988) ("nothing herein shall prevent the registration
of a mark used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant's goods
in commerce.").
51. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938).
52. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1457, 1459 (C.D.
Cal. 1991) (survey evidence showed that 39% of persons shown a. Jacobson pad and
asked, "What company or companies do you think makes this press pad?" answered
"Qualitex." None of the respondents said Jacobson. When they were asked, "What is
it that makes you think [Qualitex] makes this press pad?" numerous respondents stated
"the color").
53. id. at 1458.
54. Id. at 1461.
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1. The Claims Against Jacobson
Qualitex initially sued Jacobson for unfair competition and
trade dress infringement in violation of section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act. This claim was directed at the overall look of the
product, including the color of the product in combination with the
placement of the manufacturer's name on the product.56 After
Qualitex was issued its trademark registration, the company Supple-
mented the complaint with a claim for trademark infringement
under 15 U.S.C. § 1114. 5' This claim arose based solely on Jacob-
son's use of the green-gold color for its press pad. Jacobson filed
a counterclaim for cancellation of Qualitex' registered trademark,
claiming that Qualitex could not obtain a registration for color
alone.5
2. Trademark Infringement
In order to prevail on its trademark infringement claim,
Qualitex had to prove that: (1) it possessed a valid trademark; and
(2) that Jacobson's use of a similar mark was likely to cause confu-
sion, 59 mistake or deception in the marketplace.6° Due to the regis-
55. Qualitex, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460-61. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Supp. V 1993)
provides:
(a)(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or de-
vice, or combination thereof, or any false designation of origin ... which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive... as to the
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person.., shall be liable ....
Id.
56. Qualitex, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462.
57. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988) ("Any person who shall, without the consent of the
registrant--(a) use in commerce any... copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark
... to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive... shall be liable..
58. Qualitex, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462; see 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (1988).
59. "Likelihood of Confusion" is a standard test for infringement. Polaroid Corp. v.
Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961).
In the Ninth Circuit, the factors to be considered in determining likelihood of confusion
are as follows:
1) the strength of the plaintiffs mark;
2) relatedness of the goods;
3) similarity of the marks;
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tered trademark, Qualitex had a presumption, granted by statute, of
a valid trademark.6' The district court held that Jacobson had not
met its burden to overcome that presumption, and thus, the color
trademark was valid.62 The court found Jacobson had infringed
Qualitex' trademark, at least in part, because Jacobson had intended
to copy the trademark (the green-gold color) and confuse and de-
ceive the marketplace with an identical color. 3
The district court also alluded to the doctrine of "color deple-
tion," although it did not apply the doctrine to bar Qualitex' trade-
mark.' According to this doctrine, if each competitor in a particu-
lar market is given a trademark monopoly to one color, there even-
tually would be no colors left for newcomers to use and they
would be barred from competing.6 Color depletion has been ar-
gued successfully in other cases, particularly when the applicant
was attempting to trademark a primary color or a family of colors,
4) evidence of actual confusion;
5) marketing channels used;
6) likely degree of purchaser care;
7) defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and
8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines.
Landau, supra note 17, at 13, (citing, e.g., Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1461 (9th
Cir. 1994)).
60. Qualitex, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460 (citing Charles Schwab & Co. Inc., v.
Hibernia Bank, 665 F. Supp. 800, 803 (N.D. Cal. 1987)).
61. See supra note 47 and the accompanying text.
62. Qualitex, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460.
63. Id.
64. Id. This idea is also referred to as the "color exhaustion" or "color monopoliza-
tion" doctrine. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7.16[l]. See also William J. Keating, Devel-
opment of Evidence to Support Color-Based Trademarks, 9 J. L. AND COMM. 1, 2 (1989);
Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 847
(1949) (denying protection for red and white can); Ebert, supra note 14 at 387;
Summerfield, supra note 13, at 994-97.
65. External factors may also reduce the number of available colors. For example,
with children's products, certain color combinations are particularly appealing and only
certain dyes may be used in those products due to government toxicity standards.
Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Similarly,
in the food industry, dark colors on food packages tend to make the product look used,
while pale colors make the product look old. DEAN B. JUDD & GUNTER WYSZECKI,
COLOR IN BuSINESS, SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY, 32-33 (3d ed. 1975) (cited in Summerfield,
supra note 13, 973 n.4). Thus, these colors would be effectively unavailable to competi-
tors.
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such as all shades of red.6 Other decisions, such as the majority
decision in Owens-Corning, have not allowed the color depletion
doctrine to serve as a complete bar to registration of color alone
marks.67 Owens-Coming colored its insulation the now-famous
pink color, while its competitors did not color their insulation.68
Therefore, all other colors were available to competitors and there
was no "competitive need" for the color in the marketplace. 69 Spe-
cifically, the CAFC noted that when there is no competitive need
for the color, it is unreasonable to deny protection per se based on
the color depletion theory.70 To apply the "competitive need" test,
courts must look at the marketplace to decide if there is a need for
a particular color, or for coloration at all.7' If the colors have not
been depleted, there will be no need for any particular color. This
test, which is based on the facts of the marketplace, is unique to
color trademarks.72 It recognizes that there may be situations
where the supply of colors would be depleted, while for more stan-
dard word marks, for example, the supply of words is essentially
66. Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795, 798 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 847 (1949):
What the plaintiffs are really asking for, then, is a right to the exclusive use of
labels which are half red and half white for food products. If they may thus
monopolize red in all of its shades the next manufacturer may monopolize
orange in all its shades and the next yellow in the same way. Obviously, the
list of colors will soon run out.
Id.; see also Diamond Match Co. v. Saginaw Match Co., 142 F. 727, 729 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 203 U.S. 589 (1906) (denying protection for blue and red colors used on match
tips, noting how quickly the primary colors would be monopolized).
67. In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(color depletion theory is only useful when applied "appropriate[ly]"). See also Ebert,
supra note 14, at 393 n.77 (discussing 1993 TrAB decision using color depletion theory
as a bar to registration based on the facts); MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7.16[2], at 7-71
& nn. 10-10.1 (discussing TTAB decisions applying the rule of Owens-Coming).
68. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1122.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1122.
72. See Hugh C. Hansen, "Let Your True Colors Come Shining Through," Or Does
Federal Law Afford Trademark Protection to a Product's Color?, 4 PREVIEW OF U.S.
Sup. Cr. CASES (ABA) 188 (1994) ("Owens-Corning, however, really represents an
intermediate approach between a per se bar on the registration of color as a trademark and
the normal treatment of color as any other indicator of a product's origin.").
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limitless.
In Qualitex, the district court found no competitive need in the
industry for the green-gold color, since other colors were equally
usable.7  Also, there are "hundreds or thousands of distinctive
shades of greens, yellows, blues, and browns or tans available to
the competitors without danger that recognizing plaintiffs trade-
mark will hinder competition. 74 Thus, the color depletion argu-
ment was unsuccessful.
The district court also found that the green-gold color used by
Qualitex was not "functional," i.e., the specific color did not serve
any significant purpose other than as a trademark.75 Functionality
is another doctrine that has been used by some courts to deny pro-
tection for color marks.76 For example, a trademark can be consid-
ered aesthetically functional, as was the case in Deere & Co. v.
Farmhand, Inc.77 In Deere, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit denied trademark protection for the color green
in connection with front-end loaders because farmers already had
green tractors made by various manufacturers.78 The Eighth Circuit
agreed with the lower court's finding that farmers would want their
front-end loaders to match their tractors.79 The lower court rea-
soned that since farmers wanted the product to be green, color
served an aesthetic function, and was, therefore, "functional" be-
73. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1457, 1460 (C.D. Cal
1991).
74. Id.
75. See Ebert, supra note 14, at 384 ("[Fleatures which serve as functional compo-
nents of the product such that the product neither could work nor would be desirable
without them ... are unprotectable by trademark law.") (footnote omitted).
76. Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Iowa 1982), aff'd, 721
F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983); Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569
(2nd Cir. 1959); see also Landau, supra note 17, at 18 (discussing several cases in which
color trademarks were found functional and denied protection).
77. 560 F. Supp. 85 (S.D Iowa 1982), aff'd, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983); see also
Ebert, supra note 14, at 389 ("If such features serve solely identification purposes, trade-
mark protection will be granted, but if such features contribute to the commercial success
of the product, the feature may be viewed as aesthetically functional and denied trademark
protection.").
78. Deere, 560 F. Supp. at 98. Front-end loaders are a type of farm truck.
79. Deere, 721 F.2d at 253.
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cause it served a purpose other than as a source identifier.80
Similarly, Norwich Phamacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc.81 in-
volved the popular medicine Pepto-Bismol® and a competitor's
similarly pink-colored medication. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that since the pink color
of the liquid might serve some psychologically soothing function
on the stomach, the color was functional. 2 The color did more
than identify the source of the product because it was important to
the function of the product. Thus, trademark protection for the
color was denied.8
3
Functionality can also be considered in terms of utility. The
United States Supreme Court has stated that a trademark will be
denied protection if it is something that "is essential to the use or
purpose of the article or that affects the cost or quality of the arti-
cle."8' 4 One key reason for this utilitarian functionality doctrine is
to avoid preempting the patent system, which is specifically de-
signed and mandated to cover utilitarian innovations.8 5 The patent
system provides protection only to those who have invented some-
thing novel and then, only for a limited period.8 6 In contrast, trade-
80. Deere, 560 F. Supp. at 98. Interestingly, in a later case, the Trademark Trial and
Appeals Board granted a registration to Deere & Co. for green tractors with yellow
wheels, noting that this color combination served no function. In re Deere & Co., 7
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401 (T.T.A.B. 1988).
In Owens-Corning, the CAFC cited Deere and the aesthetic functionality bar doctrine
with apparent approval, noting that in certain situations, the bar might apply. In re
Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985). This was more
recently confirmed in Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527 (Fed. Cir.
1994), in which the CAFC denied protection to black outboard motors, partially because
consumers wanted the black color since it matched well with many different boat colors.
Id. at 1533.
81. 271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959).
82. Id. at 572 & n.7.
83. Id. at 573.
84. Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982), (citing Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964)); see also Ebert, supra note 14,
at 384-85 n.41 ("A feature is functional if it embodies the 'benefit that the consumer
wishes to purchase, as distinguished from an assurance that a particular entity made, or
sponsored or endorsed a product."') (citation omitted).
85. See Keating, supra note 64, at 10.
86. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 154 (1988).
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marks may enjoy protection for a potentially infinite duration,
which is inappropriate for technological innovations. 7 In Owens-
Corning, for example, the CAFC concluded that the pink color
applied to the insulation served no utilitarian purpose or function,
so trademark protection was granted.88
In Qualitex, the district court found that there was evidence
supporting a need for some coloration on the press pad, for exam-
ple, to hide scorch marks, and thereby showing that the color was
somewhat functional).,9 However, Qualitex' particular shade of
green-gold served this purpose no better or worse than other col-
ors.9° Indeed, many other manufacturers had been successfully
coloring their press pads many different colors for years.9' Since
neither functionality nor color depletion were bars to Qualitex'
trademark, the court held that the trademark was valid and that it
had been infringed by Jacobson.92
3. Unfair Competition
Qualitex also claimed that Jacobson had engaged in unfair com-
petition under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.93 Under section
43(a), a successful claim of unfair competition does not require a
registered trademark, or even a trademark that could be registered. 94
Thus, it is considered to cover a broad range of actionable harms. 95
87. See Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 226, 231 (1964) (discussing
that unfair competition laws should not be allowed to extend the limited patent monopo-
ly).
88. In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(functionality is tested by looking at: "(1) whether a particular design yields a utilitarian
advantage, (2) whether alternative designs are available in order to avoid hindering com-
petition, and (3) whether the design achieves economies in manufacture or use.").
89. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1457, 1460 (C.D.
Cal. 1991).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1458.
92. Id. at 1460.
93. See supra note 55.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988) (noting that in addition to words, terms, names, symbols
and devices, any false designation of origin may be actionable). 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(1).
95. Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 858 (1982).
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In Qualitex, the district court found that since Jacobson had copied
the "trade dress"'96 or overall appearance of the Qualitex pads, there
was a likelihood of confusion by consumers as to the origin of the
products, and found infringement under section 43(a).97 In addition
to copying the green-gold color, Jacobson had stamped "Magic
Glow" on the side or skirt portion of the pad cover, the same por-
tion of the pad where Qualitex stamps "Sun Glow."98 Thus, the
District Court granted an injunction against Jacobson based on
findings of trademark and trade dress infringement. 99 Perhaps hop-
ing to convince the Ninth Circuit that the traditional approach of
not protecting color marks was proper, Jacobson appealed the deci-
sion to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. °°
B. The Ninth Circuit Reverses
Before Qualitex, the Ninth Circuit had been receptive to the
notion of trademark protection for color alone. In the 1987 deci-
sion in First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc.,0'' the Ninth Circuit
accepted the CAFC's analysis in Owens-Corning and noted the
exception to the complete bar to color trademark protection.10 2 The
Court of Appeals in First Brands did believe, however, that color
depletion was a real danger and appeared to embrace the "competi-
tive need" test espoused by Owens-Corning, allowing protection for
color alone only in extraordinary situations, such as those in
Owens-Corning.
10 3
96. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 8.01[1], at 8-2 ("To determine trade dress in-
fringement; the court must consider the total image or overall impression of plaintiff's
product, package and advertising and compare this with the corresponding image or
impression of defendant's product.") (footnote omitted); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2755 n.1 (1992) (trade dress "involves the total image of a product
and may include features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graph-
ics, or even particular sales techniques") (citation omitted).
97. Qualitex, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462.
98. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994).
99. Qualitex, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462.
100. Id. at 1300.
101. 809 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1987).
102. Id. at 1382; see also Ebert, supra note 14, at 394 (noting that commentators
view First Brands as an acceptance of Owens-Corning).
103. First Brands, 809 F.2d at 1382; see also supra notes 69-72 and accompanying
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Six years later, the Ninth Circuit was confronted with a similar
issue in International Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc.104 In
International Jensen, both parties' stereo speakers included blue
"surrounds," which attach the speaker cones to the housings.,05 On
the issue of whether color alone could be protected at all, the court
specifically left the question open."° The court noted instead that
many competitors' surrounds were colored, and therefore, consum-
ers take particular care in choosing which product they prefer and
which manufacturer they choose to patronize.'0 7 Further, when the
overall appearance of the two speakers was considered, the Court
concluded that there was no possibility of likelihood of confusion,
and therefore, no protection for the blue color was warranted in
that case.'08
In Qualitex, the Ninth Circuit once again addressed the color
per se trademark issue. The Ninth Circuit admitted early in the
decision that trademark protection for color alone was not explicitly
barred by the Lanham Act.1°9 The court, however, ignored the
statutory breadth of the Lanham Act and decided that "the better
rule" would be to block protection for color per se trademarks,
relying on the color depletion theory, among others."0 The court
distinguished its own decision in First Brands by commenting that
First Brands was a trade dress suit, involving the overall image of
the packaging, and not a trademark suit."' Further, while the court
in First Brands had appeared to admit that Owens-Corning created
text discussing the competitive need test.
104. 4 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 1993). An interesting side note to, this case was that the
Senior Circuit Judge for the Seventh Circuit, which had already rejected protection for
color marks (see NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp. 917 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1990)), was
sitting by designation and wrote the opinion for the Ninth Circuit. International Jensen,
4 F.3d at 821.
105. International Jensen, 4 F.3d at 821.
106. Id. at 824.
107. Id. at 825.
108. Id.
109. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co. 13 F.3d 1297, 1301 (9th Cir. 1994).
110. Id. at 1301-02. The court also mentioned shade confusion, discussed infra, and
the "adequate" protection already provided by claims under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
Id. at 1302-03.
111. Id. at 1302.
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an exception to the color per se bar for certain marks, the Ninth
Circuit claimed that it was only referring to the exception in the
context of a trade dress case." 2
One of the key arguments against protection for color per se
that the Ninth Circuit found persuasive was the "shade confusion"
theory.1 3 This doctrine is based on the alleged difficulty of manu-
facturers and courts in determining when one color will infringe a
color trademark that is similar although not identical." 4 For exam-
ple, in a hypothetical Qualitex-type situation, Jacobson might have
wanted to avoid infringing Qualitex' distinctive mark in the green-
gold color, rather than intentionally copying it. If Jacobson wanted
to pick a green-like color to match its other products, the issue
would arise as to whether the shade of green and the protected
shade of green-gold would be close enough to constitute an in-
fringement.
The court in Owens-Corning had already rejected this doctrine,
noting that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ("TTAB") with-
in the PTO has been able to decide several cases to date based on
shade." 5 The confusion issue would likely be treated as any other
word mark, with help from expert testimony and the traditional
"likelihood of confusion" test."6 Thus, according to some circuits
before Qualitex, determining a shade confusion issue was similar
to determining a word confusion issue."17
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 1990);
In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Bissell, J.,
dissenting); see also Landau, supra note 17, at 15; Summerfield, supra note 13, at 991-94.
114. See, e.g., NutraSweet, 917 F.2d at 1027 ("How different do the colors have to
be?"); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7.16[1], at 7-68 to -70.
115. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1123, (citing, among others, Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Armco Steel Corp., 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 162 (T.T.A.B. 1971) (the "Board
'can make its own comparison' of grey and orange banded fence post versus orange
banded pipe")).
116. Master Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 224 (8th Cir. 1993) ("expert
witnesses are available to testify regarding the similarity of the colors at issue"). See
supra note 59 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1123 ("[w]e agree with the Board that
'[d]eciding likelihood of confusion among color shades ... is no more difficult or subtle
than deciding likelihood of confusion where word marks are involved"') (citation omit-
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The Ninth Circuit, however, determined that drawing distinc-
tions between close shades of color could present "unnecessary
problems." The court declined, however, to specifically discuss
why these potentially difficult questions were "unnecessary" while
difficult word mark questions occur frequently. " 8 The court merely
referred to other cases that discussed the shade confusion theory." 9
Later in the decision, the court, in discussing trade dress, seemed
to contradict itself by concluding that it was not error for the dis-
trict court to conclude that "the range of tones of available distinc-
tive suitable colors ... is in the hundreds if not thousands."' 120
Even though the Ninth Circuit denied the trademark infringe-
ment claims, the court upheld the district court's decision concern-
ing trade dress, finding infringement and recognizing that Jacobson
had willfully copied Qualitex' trade dress, including not only the
color of Qualitex' product, but also elements such as the placement
of the label on the product.' 2'
The end result of the Ninth Circuit's decision was that the
trademark infringement claim was reversed and Qualitex' previous-
ly valid trademark in the green-gold color for press pads was can-
celled. 22 This cancellation emphasized the problem of inconsistent
rulings in this area, since the trademark was cancelled nationwide.
If Qualitex had brought the suit in the Eighth or Federal Circuits,
it would have retained its national rights.123 On one level, Qualitex
won the appeal, since the trade dress infringement claim under
ted); see also Lupo, supra note 1, at 663 ("[clourts can compare two color marks just as
easily as comparing two word marks").
118. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994).
119. Id. (referring to the NutraSweet decision and the dissent in Owens-Coming).
120. Id. at 1304. If there were thousands of distinct colors available, how could
color depletion become a problem? The Ninth Circuit also accepted the injunction against
Jacobson, which stated that Jacobson would not use the same green-gold color, "or so
close to said color that it cannot be easily distinguished from the Qualitex color by the
casual user." Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1457, 1462
(C.D. Cal. 1991). Obviously, the court would be willing to judge shades for the injunc-
tion, but not for trademark registration or infringement-a seemingly nonsensical ap-
proach.
121. Qualitex, 13 F.3d at 1304.
122. Id. at 1305.
123. See supra note 11.
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section 43(a) was affirmed, as was the injunction preventing Jacob-
son from further use of the infringing trade dress. 4. However, if
Jacobson were to have performed a simple change to its trade
dress, such as moving the placement of the label, Qualitex would
have only been able to rely on the identical color of the competing
pad for its claim and would probably have lost any future lawsuits
in, at least, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits. Thus, Jacobson would
have been able to confuse consumers into buying its product at the
expense of Qualitex.
Realizing its hollow victory, Qualitex petitioned the United
States Supreme Court and was granted certiorari."' The sole issue
on appeal was "[w]hether the Lanham [Act] permits the registration
of a trademark that consists, purely and simply, of a color."12 6 In
addition to the petitioner's and respondent's briefs, the Supreme
Court allowed ten amicus briefs to be filed.127
C. The Supreme Court Takes the Appeal
1. The Petitioner's Brief
Qualitex initially focused on the plain meaning of the Lanham
Act to support its position that the Lanham Act allows protection
for color alone.1 28 Qualitex argued that, as the Ninth Circuit con-
ceded, color alone is encompassed by the definition of "trademark"
in the Lanham Act.12 9 Qualitex further noted that section 2 of the
Lanham Act provides that "[n]o trademark by which the goods of
124. Qualitex, 13 F.3d at 1305.
125. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1302 (1995).
126. Id.
127. Briefs were filed in support of Qualitex by: Bar Association of the District of
Columbia; B.F. Goodrich Company; The Crosby Group, Inc.; Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up
Corporation; Hand Tool Institute; Intellectual Property Owners; International Trademark
Association; Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corporation; United States. Briefs were filed in
support of Jacobson by the.Private Label Manufacturers Association. Hansen, supra note
72.
128. Qualitex, 13 F.3d at 1301; Master Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219,
222 (8th Cir. 1993).
129. See Qualitex, 13 F.3d at 1301; Qualitex, No. 93-1577, Petitioner's Brief on the
Merits, at *10.
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the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall
be refused registration on the principal register on account of its
nature" unless the mark falls within certain statutory exceptions. 130
None of the exceptions prohibits a color trademark from registra-
tion.
Despite this clear language, and despite the acknowledgement
of the Ninth Circuit that the Lanham Act does not explicitly bar the
registration of color trademarks, the Ninth Circuit decided to follow
its "better rule" and bar color marks altogether. 131 Qualitex argued
that the Supreme Court had stated several times that courts may not
substitute their own opinion of what the law should be for the un-
ambiguous language of a statute. 32 Since the Ninth Circuit did not
provide any statutory authority for its decision to bar color trade-
marks, while admitting that authority existed for allowing them,
Qualitex argued that the Ninth Circuit's decision was erroneous.
Expanding on the interpretation of the statute, Qualitex argued
that congressional intent, evidenced by the legislative history of the
Lanham Act, supported granting trademark protection for color
trademarks. 34 Qualitex explained that when Congress was consid-
ering the Lanham Act, it considered and rejected a definition of
130. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added). The exceptions
are: (1) scandalous or immoral matter; (2) national symbols; (3) the name or portrait of
a living person without consent; (4) marks which are confusingly similar to previously
registered marks; and (5) marks which are merely descriptive, geographically descriptive,
or deceptively misdescriptive. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)-(e); Qualitex, Petitioner's Brief
on the Merits, at *13.
131. See supra notes 109-121 and accompanying text.
132. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, at *13, (citing Freytag v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 873 (1991); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S.
618, 625-626, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 884 (1978); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,
541 n. 10, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976)). Qualitex also quoted an old Supreme
Court case:
It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be
sought in the language in which the [A]ct is framed, and if that is plain, and if
the law is within the constitutional authority of the law-making body which
passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
133. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, at *14.
134. Id. at *14.
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"trademark" that was narrower than that of prior Acts. 35 Instead,
Congress adopted language permitting the registration of any indi-
cia that can function as a trademark, including, but not limited to,
words, names, symbols, or devices.
136
Qualitex further explained that the legislative history of the
more recently enacted Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988
("TLRA")137 also supports the theory that Congress intended to
permit registration of color marks. 138 When Congress was consid-
ering the TLRA, Owens-Corning had already been decided and the
PTO had registered a number of color trademarks. 139 Even with the
existing interpretations of the Lanham Act, of which Congress must
have been aware, Congress could have amended the Lanham Act
to preclude color registrations. Instead, Qualitex pointed out, Con-
gress "intentionally retained ... the words 'symbol or device' so
as not to preclude registration of colors, shapes, sounds or configu-
rations where they function as trademarks."'
140
135. Id. at *15, (citing Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189,
197 (1985) (citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 2322, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1946))).
136. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988). Under the definition of trademark, the statute
states: "The term 'trademark' includes any word, name, symbol, or device," while the
definition of a service mark states "The term 'service mark' means any word, name,
symbol, or device" (emphasis added). Id. The definitions of certification mark and
collective mark also use "means" instead of "includes." This may imply that the defini-
tion of a trademark is not intended to be limiting.
137. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935,
3946 (1988).
138. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, at *16.
139. Id. (citing, e.g., Registration No. 1,447,706, dated July 14, 1987, for the color
orange as applied to inserts for finger holes in bowling balls; and several other registra-
tions). The revision of the Lanham Act closely tracked the United States Trademark
Association's (now the International Trademark Association) Trademark Review Commis-
sion Report and Recommendation to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADE-
MARK REP. 375 (1987), which stated that the definition of trademark should not preclude
registration of "such things as color, shape, smell, sound or configuration." Id. at 421.
140. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at *17-18, (citing S. Rep. No. 515, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess., 44 (1989), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5607). Congress also evi-
denced similar intent in approving the North American Free Trade Agreement, which
provides, "For purposes of this Agreement, a trademark consists of any sign, or combina-
tion of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one person from those of
another, including personal names, designs, letters, numerals, colors, figurative elements,
or the shape of goods or their packaging." Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, at *18 (quot-
ing North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Art. 1708(1), 32 I.L.M. 605,
670 (1993) implemented by the North American Free Trade Implementation Act, Pub. L.
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Further bolstering Qualitex' interpretation of the statute is the
construction given the statute by the agency charged with adminis-
tering it-the PTO.14' Qualitex argued that over the years, and in
particular in the years since Owens-Corning,142 the Trademark Of-
fice has registered color trademarks when the statutory criteria are
met and refused registration when they are not. 143 The Patent and
Trademark Office has even developed specific internal procedures
for handling color trademark applications. 144 These procedures
follow the interpretation of Owens-Corning and its "competitive
need" test as follows: "The burden of proof in such a case is sub-
stantial ... [W]here the applicant seeks registration for overall
color, registration is refused irrespective of any showing of ac-
quired distinctiveness if there is a competitive need for colors to
remain available in the industry."'
' 45
Qualitex argued that this construction should not be disturbed
by a court if it reflects a plausible construction of the plain lan-
guage of the statute and does not otherwise conflict with the ex-
pressed intent of Congress. 46 In many areas of administrative law,
this principle may be true. However, where the PTO is concerned,
the courts have been more than willing to override the Office's
construction and impose their own. 47 Thus, even though the "def-
erence" portion of Qualitex' argument appeared to carry little
weight, both the language of the statute and the congressional in-
tent weighed heavily in Qualitex' favor.
No. 103-182, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 2057 (emphasis added)).
141. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, at *19.
142. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
143. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, at *19 n.21 (citing, e.g., British Seagull, Ltd.
v. Brunswick Corp., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1197 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (refusing to register
black for outboard marine engines where the color was functional-the color helped to
make the engine look smaller and blended well with other colors-and lacked secondary
meaning)). See also supra note 19 discussing the statutory criteria.
144. TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMWINNG PROCEDURE, § 1202.04(e) (2d ed. 1993).
145. Id.
146. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, at *22 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
184 (1991)).
147. Hansen, supra note 72 ("[I]n day-to-day intellectual property, deference usually
is not given either to the Patent and Trademark Office or to the Copyright Office.").
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The Qualitex brief concluded with various policy reasons for
registering color trademarks. 41 In addition to color depletion 49 and
shade confusion, 150 Qualitex stressed the basic nature of trademarks,
which is to provide consumers with information relating to the
source of the goods to aid in the selection of those goods.' 5'
2. The Respondent's Brief
In its brief, Jacobson took a position that seemed difficult to
defend. In the first sentences of the brief, Jacobson appeared to
concede victory to Qualitex:
This court has granted certiorari on one issue: whether the
Lanham Act prohibits the registration of color as a trade-
mark. Respondent would answer "no." It is not arguable
that the Lanham Act allows the registration of color as a
trademark, when the use of the color functions as a trade-
mark. 1
52
Instead of arguing the issue on appeal, Jacobson contended that
the factual determinations made in the courts below were errone-
ous. 53 Specifically, Jacobson argued that the green-gold color on
the Qualitex pads, or any mere product coloration for that matter,
could not function as a trademark. 54 Jacobson further argued that
mere product color is not a "symbol" or "device" and thus could
not be a "trademark" use of the color, as defined by statute. 55
Jacobson also attempted to turn Qualitex' legislative history
argument around. Jacobson argued that while Congress was con-
148. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at *22.
149. See id. at *25.
150. See id. at *25-*26.
151. Id. at *23-*24 ("Failure to protect indicia on which consumers rely to obtain
the product they desire will result in confusion as counterfeit products freely enter the
market. The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological
function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we pur-
chase goods by them.").
152. Qualitex, No. 93-1577, Brief for Respondent, at *1.
153. See, e.g., id. at *11.
154. Id. at *1-2.
155. Qualitex, Brief for Respondent, at *10.
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sidering the 1988 TLRA, it apparently knew about the Owens-
Corning decision, 5 6 the Trademark Commission's report, 5 7 and the
PTO's interpretation of the statute. l5  In such an informed atmo-
sphere, Congress could have explicitly included color alone as a
registrable trademark, but did not, implying that color was to be
excluded.159  o
Continuing its argument that the green-gold color did not func-
tion as a trademark, Jacobson argued that since the use of color for
press pads is necessary for the marketability of the product, the
color is purely functional and therefore barred from registration
under the functionality doctrine." ° Jacobson also reiterated the
traditional concepts of color depletion and shade confusion.' 61
Again trying to shift the focus from the actual issue on appeal,
on which they had already admitted defeat, Jacobson attempted to
distinguish Owens-Corning from the case at bar by stating that the
holding in Owens-Corning "should be limited to the facts of that
case." This only emphasized that the issue on appeal, which was
the Ninth Circuit's denial of trademark protection for color per se
and not just in this case, should be decided in Qualitex' favor.
3. The Petitioner's Reply Brief
In its reply brief, Qualitex quickly pointed out that Jacobson
had essentially conceded the case. 62 Qualitex further noted that
United States Supreme Court rules preclude raising additional ques-
tions or changing the substance of the questions certified for review
in any brief on the merits. 6 3 Qualitex suggested that the Ninth
Circuit should be reversed on the sole question presented, since
156. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 139.
158. See notes 144-145 and accompanying text.
159. Qualitex, Brief for Respondent, at * 11 n.8.
160. Id. at *20. See also supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
161. Brief for Respondent, at *21-*23; see also supra notes 64-67 and 113-117 and
accompanying text.
162. Qualitex, No. 93-1577, Petitioner's Reply Brief, at *1.
163. Id. at *1-*2, (citing Supreme Court Rules 24.1(a) and 24.2).
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both parties agreed on that answer.164
In addition to attacking Jacobson's arguments and newly raised
factual issues, Qualitex again pointed out that the registration of
color trademarks serves the underlying policies of the Lanham
Act. 65 Especially in Qualitex' case, in which the green-gold color
identified its product for over thirty years, denying protection
would promote confusion in the marketplace by depriving custom-
ers of the trademark they rely on to choose the desired product.' 66
Given the briefs that the Supreme Court had to consider, com-
plete with Jacobson's self-defeating and procedurally unusual argu-
ments, it would have been difficult for the Court not to acknowl-
edge that the Lanham Act permitted trademark registration for
color alone.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Qualitex
was unanimous and the sole opinion was delivered by Justice
Breyer. 67 The Court, in its decision, echoed the points made by
Qualitex in its briefs concerning the statutory language of the
Lanham Act.168 Referring to section 45 of the Lanham Act, 169 the
164. id. at *2.
165. Qualitex cited the various Amicus briefs filed in support of their position, listing
the following policy interests served by registration for color marks:
1) Color registration will protect the ability of consumers to distinguish between
competing producers.
2) Denying exclusive rights and registration to a color which has acquired secondary
meaning would promote confusion and deception.
3) Registration of color advances the Lanham Act's objective of registering as many
marks in use as practicable so competitors may effectively search the marks in use and
avoid conflicts.
4) Denying registrability to color is inconsistent with global harmonization in trade-
mark law.
5) Permitting color registration supports the United States' advocacy to other coun-
tries that recognize color as a trademark.
Id. at *13 n.16 (citations omitted).
166. Petitioner's Reply Brief at * 13; see also supra notes 53-54 and accompanying
text.
167. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
168. See id. at 1302-03.
169. Trademarks "includ[e] any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
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Court stated that "[slince human beings might use as a 'symbol' or
'device' almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning,
this language, read literally, is not restrictive."170  Noting that
shapes, sounds and fragrances can act as symbols under the
Lanham Act, the Court could find no reason why color could not
do the same.171
The Court then agreed with Qualitex that color is capable of
satisfying the most important part of the statutory definition of a
trademark, which is to act as a source identifier.7 2 As with other
"descriptive" marks that do not necessarily indicate source, color
may, over time, develop secondary meaning, such that "in the
minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature
... is to identify the source of the product rather than the product
itself."'7 Importantly, the court indicated that a product's color
can not be considered a "fanciful," "arbitrary," or "suggestive"
mark. "'74 In practical terms, this means that product color will not
be able to be registered without acquiring secondary meaning.
Manufacturers will not be able to register their marks upon product
initial introduction to the marketplace. While this may present
some inconvenience in obtaining full trademark protection for color
alone, the Supreme Court made it clear that such protection is
available. The Court stated that it is the source-distinguishing
ability of a mark-not its status as color, shape, fragrance, word,
or sign-that permits it to serve as a trademark. 7 5 Thus, the Court
could not find, in basic trademark objectives, a reason to disqualify
absolutely the use of a color as a mark. 17 6
The Court also made it clear that the functionality doctrine is
alive and well, even with respect to color trademarks, but it is not
an absolute bar.177 The Court followed its previous rulings in the
170. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1302-03.
171. Id. at 1303.
172. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988); supra note 2.
173. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1303 (quoting Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456
U.S. 844, 851 n.ll (1982)).
174. Id. (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-10
(2d Cir. 1976) (Friendly, J.)).
175. Id. at 1304.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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functionality area by reiterating that,
[i]n general terms, a product feature is functional and can-
not serve as a trademark if it is essential to the use or pur-
pose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the
article, that is, if exclusive use of the feature would put
competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvan-
tage. 7
8
The Court also realized that while color may sometimes play an
important role in the desirability of a product that is unrelated to
source identification, sometimes it might not. 179  In those latter
instances where color is not essential to the product's use or pur-
pose and does not affect cost or quality, functionality will not be
a bar to the use or registration of color alone. 80 The Court fol-
lowed the findings of the district court, which were accepted by the
Ninth Circuit, that Qualitex' green-gold color had acquired second-
ary meaning and that the specific color served no other function."18
Perhaps settling the color alone trademark controversy forever,
the Court then attacked each argument used by Jacobson and the
courts denying protection for color alone, beginning with shade
confusion.' 82 The Court cited cases that have already made the
"difficult" shade confusion determinations. 8 3 Noting that courts
decide difficult questions on the similarity of words, phrases or
symbols, the Court concluded that shade questions are not "special"
and should be treated like any other trademark questions.'
178. Id. (citing Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (quota-
tion marks omitted)).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1305. The Court made note of the fact that some color is important on
the press pads, but agreed with the district court that no "competitive need" existed for
the green-gold color, since other colors were equally usable. Id. Although only dicta and
placed in a parenthetical comment, this likely serves as an affirmation of the "competitive
need" test advanced by the CAFC and followed by the Patent and Trademark Office and
T'rAB.
182. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1305.
183. Id.
184. Id. ("Legal standards exist to guide courts in making such comparisons....
We do not see why courts could not apply those standards to a color, replicating, if
[Vol. 5:481
1995] QUALITEX V. JACOBSON: COLOR PER SE TRADEMARKS 507
The color depletion theory, however, did carry some weight
with the Court. The Court noted that in some cases, the use of
particular colors is necessary, such as with medical pills where the
color serves to identify the type of medicine.'8 5 In such a case, the
needed colors could be depleted and the functionality doctrine
would apply. Since the color would be "essential to the use or
purpose" or the product, it would not be protectable as a trade-
mark.186 However, these particular instances do not justify a blan-
ket prohibition. 8 7 Courts simply need to apply the doctrine in a
careful manner, with sensitivity to the effects on competition.
88
Citing to several district and circuit court decisions in which such
care and sensitivity has already been successfully and properly
exercised, the Court found no reason to apply a per se ban based
on color depletion.189
The Supreme Court also put to rest the notion that any pre-
Lanham Act jurisprudence should be considered with respect to
color alone trademarks.' 9° The Court adopted many of the argu-
ments put forth by Qualitex in its brief on the merits relating to the
legislative history of the Lanham Act and subsequent congressional
actions.19' Most notably, the Court stated that "the Federal Circuit
was right" in Owens-Corning when it found that the Lanham Act
"embodied crucial legal changes that liberalized the law to permit
the use of color alone as a trademark (under appropriate circum-
stances)."' 92
necessary, lighting conditions under which a colored product is normally sold" (citations
omitted)).
185. Id. at 1306 (citing Inwood Lab. Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853, 857-
58 & n.20 (1982)).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. (citing Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 98 (S.D. Iowa
1982), aff'd 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983); Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35
F.3d 1527, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. pending, No. 94-1075; Nor-Am Chemical v. O.M.
Scott & Sons Co., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1316, 1320 (E.D. Pa. 1987)).
190. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1307.
191. See supra part II.C.1.; Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1307-08.
192. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1308.
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The revisions to the Lanham Act made by the TLRA did not
include explicit language permitting color alone trademarks, but
that should not be interpreted as a lack of authority, as argued by
Jacobson.193 Rather, the Supreme Court concluded that when Con-
gress re-enacted the terms "word, name, symbol, or device,"'' 94 "it
did so against a legal background in which those terms had come
to include color, and its statutory revision embraced that under-
standing."'' 95
Finally, the Court attacked Jacobson's argument that color can
be adequately protected by "trade dress" claims under section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act. In the Ninth Circuit, Qualitex had indeed
received significant protection under "trade dress" infringement. 96
However, the Court understood that trademark registration confers
a wealth of benefits that are not available under section 43(a).' 97
These include the ability to prevent importation of confusingly
similar goods,' 98 constructive notice of ownership,' 99 and incontest-
ability after five years.2 ° Unable to find any reason why a blanket
prohibition should be imposed on color alone trademarks, the Court
decided that these marks should not be denied the statutory benefits
Congress intended to bestow upon them.20' Thus, the Court re-
versed the Ninth Circuit, validating Qualitex' registered trademark
and holding Jacobson liable for trademark infringement. 202
193. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
194. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
195. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1308. The Court also referred to the Senate Report
accompanying the TLRA: The "revised definition intentionally retains ... the words
'symbol or device' so as not to preclude the registration of colors, shapes, sounds or
configurations where they function as trademarks." Id. (quoting S.REP. No. 100-515,
100th Cong., 2d. Sess., reprinted in 44 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5607 (1988)).
196. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's injunction based only on trade
dress, which is the same injunction Qualitex won on its trademark infringement claim.
Qualitex, 13 F.3d at 1305.
197. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1308.
198. 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988).
199. 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1988).
200. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1988).
201. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1308.
202. Id.
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT FALLS A SHADE SHORT
The Supreme Court's decision in Qualitex followed the wide
reach of the Lanham Act by allowing trademark registration for
color alone.2 °3 However, the Court was cautious and has created
barriers to obtaining registration that may thwart applicants in ob-
taining federal registration in many instances. Chiefly, the Court
noted that color alone trademarks are entitled to registration "where
that color has attained 'secondary meaning' and therefore identifies
and distinguishes a particular brand."2°a
One commentator, writing before the case was decided, noted
that such a standard conflicts with the Court's prior ruling in Two
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,205 which stated that inherently
distinctive marks, i.e., marks that are not descriptive of the product,
do not require secondary meaning.2° In Qualitex, the Court is
essentially said that all color trademarks, whether they are descrip-
tive of the product or not, require secondary meaning.
This broad requirement was likely born out of the understand-
ing that color alone does not normally function as a trademark, but
is rather seen by the consuming public as mere coloration. Since
the Lanham Act requires that registered marks function as trade-
marks, forcing applicants to prove secondary meaning before issu-
ing a registration ensures that only those color alone marks that are
functioning as trademarks will be registered. Unfortunately, it may
be difficult to build up the necessary consumer recognition suffi-
cient to prove secondary meaning. 20 7 In fact, it may take several
years, during which time competitors may be able to take a free
ride on any reputation (known as "goodwill")20 8 that the potential
applicant has developed. Some courts have also recently rejected
203. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
204. Id. at 1303.
205. 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
206. See Landau, supra note 17, at 57-58.
207. See Keating, supra note 64, at 5-6, 17-18.
208. See RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS
AND MONOPOLIES, § 1.11, at 1-36 (4th ed. 1994) ("Goodwill is not simply to be equated
with reputation. It includes, but connotes more than, good credit, honesty, fair name and
reliability").
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the notion of "secondary meaning in the making," which aimed to
provide limited protection while a producer was building up the
necessary reputation, but had not yet achieved enough to gain full
trademark status.2°9
This difficult situation of waiting to develop secondary meaning
is not uncommon for descriptive marks, which require secondary
meaning to be registered. However, non-descriptive marks2 0 nor-
mally do not have that requirement and thus may obtain registra-
tion soon after their first use in commerce.11
To avoid the heavy burden of proving secondary meaning for
all color marks before registration, the courts and the PTO should
address the real issue for most color marks, which is whether or
not the color is functioning as a trademark.21 2 If the color is mere-
ly descriptive of the goods, the functionality doctrine, or perhaps
color depletion, may apply to block registration. But if an appli-
cant is using a color that has absolutely nothing to do with the
goods, the PTO should require the applicant to show that the color
is being used as a mark and not merely as decoration, without the
added requirement of secondary meaning. Use as a trademark can
be shown by means of supporting advertising, as was done in the
Owens-Corning case.213
Of course, situations would arise in which the evidence of use
as a mark would not be sufficient. If the applicant used several
different colors, such as a variety of "designer" colors for the same
product, and then attempted to claim a trademark in each separate
color, then obviously, the color is not serving as a trademark. With
the Supreme Court's decision in Qualitex, however, the courts and
the PTO are bound to refuse registration to any color per se mark
that has not gained secondary meaning. With the effort already ex-
209. See Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Telecoms. Group, 900 F.2d 1546, 1549-50 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
210. These marks are usually considered "suggestive," "fanciful," or "arbitrary." See
Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1303 (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537
F.2d 4, 9-10 (2nd Cir. 1976)).
211. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1988).
212. See In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1050 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
213. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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pended on trademark applications by the Examining Attorneys, they
should be able to make the determination as to whether the color
functions as a mark on a case-by-case basis.
CONCLUSION
In Qualitex, the United States Supreme Court followed the
course set by the CAFC in Owens-Corning in 1985. By allowing
color per se trademarks to be registered, the broad issue has been
resolved. However, the limitations imposed on obtaining that reg-
istration will likely prevent many producers from achieving the full
trademark protection that they deserve. It remains to be seen
whether the Qualitex decision and its requirement for proof of
secondary meaning will provide adequate protection for color per
se trademarks.
Daniel R. Schechter

